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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
Case. No. 970730-CA

DONALD R. JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

Priority No. 2

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The jurisdiction of the Court is established by § 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule
3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a final Judgment and Sentence, finding the
Defendant/Appellant, (hereafter "JOHNSON"), guilty of ASSAULT BY A PRISONER, a
Third Degree Felony., Judgment was entered upon the verdict, at Jury Trial, held
September 16,1997, sentencing JOHNSON to the Utah State Prison for an
indeterminate term, not to exceed five years, with no fine or surcharge imposed, the
same to run concurrently with terms of imprisonment imposed in the Sixth District Court,
Case Nos., 931600031 and 97160016.
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ISSUES FOR REVIEW and STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1:

Whether or not it was error to go forward with the

Preliminary Hearing under the circumstances of this case, where the Defendant was
not present and no written waiver had been submitted?
Standard of Review:

The preliminary hearing, though not a full

determination of a Defendant's guilt or innocence, is none the less a "critical stage" in
criminal process, at which the Defendant's constitutional rights must be observed. See
State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986); see also, State v. Anderson. 612 P.2d at
782 n.9, citing Coleman v. Alabama. 399 U.S. 1, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 26 L Ed. 2d 387
(1969). Questions of law or questions of mixed law and fact are issues for the trial court
to decide. The standard of review is one of correctness of error as it applies to
questions of law and clearly erroneous as it applies to questions of fact. See State v.
Rameriz. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), and State v. Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah App.
1991). The preliminary examination, unless waived by the accused, with the consent of
the State, is a prerequisite to a prosecution by information. See State v. Sommers. 597
P.2d 1346 (Utah 1979). The purpose of the right to a preliminary hearing is to secure
to the accused, before he is brought to trial under an information, the right to be
advised of the nature of accusation against him, and to be confronted with and given
the opportunity to cross examine the witnesses testifying on behalf of the state. (Id.)
ISSUE NO. 2:

Whether or not the Defendant was competent to stand trial

and/or to represent himself at trial?
///
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Standard of Review:

The determination as to a defendant's competency to

stand trial is ultimately a mixed question of law and of fact. See State v. Laffertv. 749
P.2d 1239, on reconsideration, 776 P.2d 631 (Utah 1988). The Supreme Court reviews
the trial court's legal conclusions nondeferentially for correctness and its factual
determinations for clear error. See Moreno v. Board of Education of Jordan School
District. 926 P.2d 886 (Utah 1996); see also Timm v. Dewsnip. 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah
1996). When reviewing mixed findings of fact and law, the appellate court is free to
make its independent determination of the trial court's conclusions; however, the trial
court's factual findings should not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous.
See State. Department of Human Resources ex rel. Parker v. Irizarrv. 945 P.2d 676
(Utah 1997). On the merits of the competency issue, Utah Code Annotated § 77-15-1
et. seq. (1953, as amended) requires the trial court to determine whether an accused
has the ability to understand the nature of the proceedings and the potential
punishment, and has the ability to assist counsel in his or her defense. See State v.
Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997). When there is a substantial question of
possible doubt as to the defendant's competency.... the trial court must hold a hearing
to determine the defendant's present competency.... See State v. Holland. 281 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3, (Utah 1996).
ISSUE NO. 3:

Whether or not the Defendant received effective assistance

of legal counsel through all pretrial proceedings and at trial, by the utilization of
standby counsel?
///
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Standard of Review:

In analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, the Court of Appeals must review the totality of the circumstances and the
complete context in which the possible attorney error occurred. See State v. Pursifell.
746 P.2d 270 (Utah Crt. App. 1987). A presumption exists on appeal that the trial was
fundamentally fair to the Defendant. See State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986).
To prevail, the Defendant must meet the Strickland test, that is, (1) counsels
representation falls below "objective reasonableness", resulting in (2) prejudice to the
defendant. See Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 690,104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066,
80 L Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
ISSUE NO. 4:

Whether or not the Defendant's right to a speedy trial was

denied where the matter did not go to trial until approximately eleven months after the
incident?
Standard of Review:

When deciding whether a defendant's constitutional

right to a speedy trial has been violated, courts must balance four fact sensitive factors:
length of delay; reason for delay; defendant's assertion of his right; and prejudice to
defendant. See State v. Hovt. 806 P.2d 204 (Utah App. 1991). Where the period of
time between the Defendant's arrest and a trial is in excess of the statutory directive
there may be a trick "triggering" mechanism for heightened scrutiny of the claim that
defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was denied. (Id.)
ISSUE NO. 5:

Whether or not the trial court erred in refusing to clarify the

jury instructions opposed by Defendant, or by failing to include additional instructions
fundamental to the case?
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Standard of Review:

The standard for clarity in jury instructions is higher

than for a statute. See State v. LeFaber. 913 P.2d 369,128 Wash. 2d. 896,
reconsideration denied. (Wash. 1996). A jury instruction will not be found to be
defective absent a showing that the instruction confused or mislead the jury about the
proper principles of law. See Marauez v. State. 941 P.2d 22 (Wyo. 1997). Failure to
give any instruction on the essential elements of a criminal offense is fundamental
error, requiring reversal of defendant's conviction, as it is a confusing and misleading
instruction. See Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936 (Wyo. 1997). The Supreme Court
reviews jury instructions in their entirety and will affirm when instructions, taken as a
whole, fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case. State v. Robertson. 932
P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997).
ISSUE NO. 6:

Whether or not the evidence presented at trial was sufficient

to find the Defendant guilty of the offense of assault by a prisoner?
Standard of Review:

The test for assessing inconsistency in jury verdicts is

whether the jury had to rely on the same evidence in producing two apparently
inconsistent conclusions. See People v. Quinn. 794 P.2d 1066 (Colo. App. 1990). If
two criminal offenses arise out of the same transaction and are charged in separate
counts and one offense includes elements or acts necessary to the commission of the
other, the jury's verdicts are inconsistent if the jury convicts on one and acquits on the
other. See State v. Culver. 675 P.2d 622, 36 Wash. App. 524, Review denied (Wash.
App. 1984).
///
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ISSUE NO. 7:

Whether or not it was error to sentence the Defendant

without first appointing legal and then requiring the preparation of a presentence
investigation report?
Standard of Review:

The Defendant is entitled to the effective assistance

of counsel at sentencing to ensure compliance with due process requirements. See
State v. Gomez. 887 P.2d 853 (Utah 1994). The claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel may not be speculative, but must be demonstrative of reality, sufficient to
overcome strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and
exercised "reasonable professional judgment". See State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401
(Utah 1986). In analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court of
Appeals must review the totality of circumstances in complete context in which possible
attorney error occurred. See State v. Harper. 761 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1988). The fact
that the Defendant does not get along with his attorney does not, standing alone,
establish denial of effective assistance of counsel; Defendant must also establish that
the animosity has resulted in such deterioration of attorney-client relationships that the
right of effective assistance of counsel is impaired. See Gardner v. Holden. 888 P.2d
608, rehearing denied, certiorari denied, 116 S. Ct. 97,133 L. Ed. 2d 52.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES and RULES
The determinative statutes and/or rules are believed to be § 78-5-102.5; § 7715-1, et. seq.; Rule 25, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution; and Section 12, Article 1, of the Utah State Constitution.
///
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NATURE OF THE CASE. PROCEEDINGS and DISPOSITION AT TRIAL
JOHNSON'S conviction resulted from a forced restraint, while he was confined to
the Kane County Correctional Facility, on or about the 19th of October, 1996.
JOHNSON was denied visitation of his mother, became vocal and threw two shoes and
,in apple from his cell, (trial transcript at page 23). Five officers entered his cell and
JOHNSON resisted and was injured in the process, (jd. at 31 & 32.)
A Preliminary Hearing was held in JOHNSON'S absence, on or about the 21st
day of November, 1996. JOHNSON had court appointed counsel, Floyd Holm.
Counsel informed the Court at the time of Preliminary Hearing that JOHNSON choose
not to be present. (Preliminary Hearing I ranscript at page 3).
A jury trial was held on the 16th day of September, 1997. JOHNSON
represented himself with the assistance of attorney KARLIN MYERS, appointed by the
Court to act as standby counsel. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to the charge
of ASSAULT BY A PRISONER, a Third Degree Felony, and not guilty on two separate
counts of ASSAULT ON A CORRECTIONAL OFFICER, Class A Misdemeanors. The
Trial Court sentenced JOHNSON, but did so without the benefit of the preparation of a
presentence investigation report. JOHNSON was sentenced to serve the indeterminate
term of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison, no fines or surcharge, to run
concurrently with other sentences, he was serving.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
JOHNSON appeals his conviction of ASSAULT BY A PRISONER, a Third
Degree Felony, arising from an incident of forced restraint involving peace officers at
Page 7 of 44

the Kane County Correctional Facility, Kanab, Utah. On October 18,1996, JOHNSON
was placed in lockdown after an alleged rule violation.1

At about 1:00 o'clock in the

afternoon on October 18,1996, (see trial transcript at page 87), JOHNSON was slow to
respond to mail call and was told that he would have to wait another hour before
receiving his mail while Officer Maddux continued to make his rounds (Jd. at page 85).
JOHNSON became disorderly by knocking a roll of toilet paper out of the hand of
Officer Maddux and then hitting a can of saving cream sitting on the bars of the cell
door. He received twenty-four hours lockdown for the incident (Jd. pages 86-87).
On October 19,1996, JOHNSON'S mother traveled from Southern California to
see her son, was given a five minute visit and told to return after lunch. (Jd. at 71).
Upon returning she was denied further visitation with JOHNSON. (Jd.) From the
vantage point of where JOHNSON was held he was able to observe on the video
monitors the discussion between corrections Officer Cole Brown and JOHNSON'S
mother (Jd. at 72). JOHNSON asked Brown if he was denying him visitation with his
mother and Brown replied that he was, without further comment (Jd.)2 JOHNSON
became agitated when BROWN offered no further explanation and tried to get the

1

Corrections Officer John Maddux on October 18,1996, believed that JOHNSON was
playing games with him by not responding to mail call. JOHNSON maintained that he did not
hear the call from Officer Maddux and when he later approached Maddux he became angry
when Maddux refused to give him his mail. Maddux maintains that he told JOHNSON that he
would have to wait another hour to receive his mail on his next round. (See Trial Transcript at
Page 85). (See also Trial Transcript at 87, 88, 69 & 70).
2

While JOHNSON was given no further explanation as to the reason for the
officer's denying him visitation, the officers maintained at trial that the denial was
because he was in lockdown status, eventhough the twenty-four hour lockdown
period should have expired prior to the second visitation by JOHNSON'S mother.
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officers' attention by throwing his shoes and an apple out of his cell and into the
walkway area. (Id.) BROWN responded by calling four other officers, who together
decided to put JOHNSON in a straight jacket (jd. at 3). The Officers entered
JOHNSON'S cell and forcibly restrained him (id. at 31 & 32.)3
JOHNSON gave some resistance, first by refusing to comply with one officer's
order to stay at the back of the cell, and, second, by taking a posture characterized as
a "football stance," although it is unclear in the record whether this was an offensive or
defensive stance, and, last, by charging the officers, (jd.) The Officers took JOHNSON
to the floor by kneeing him in the ribs. The Officers were not injured. However,
JOHNSON was injured and taken to the hospital ||d ) JOHNSON was charged on three
counts: Assault by a Prisoner, a third degree felony; and two counts of Assault of a
Corrections Officer, each a class A Misdemeanor (see amended information, R. at 4).
On or about the 21 * day of November, 1996, a preliminary hearing was held
without JOHNSON being present.4 On or about the 2nd day of January, 1997,
JOHNSON was evaluated by Dennis Jones of the Southwest Center who opined that
JOHNSON was suffering from delusions of a prosecutor type (see R. at 10) and called

3

Why the officers felt they had to enter JOHNSON'S cell and restrain him is
not clear. The officers indicated it was JOHNSON'S own safety, but do not say how
JOHNSON would have been safer from harm. It is not clear why the officers could
not have just ignored JOHNSON and avoided further incident.
4

Appointed defense counsel, Floyd Holm, maintained that JOHNSON
specifically requested not to be in court on the day of preliminary hearing (see
preliminary hearing transcript at page 3), however, it appears from JOHNSON'S
subsequent comments and filings that was not aware that a preliminary hearing
had been held (see page 3 of JOHNSON'S docketing statement filed with the Court
of Appeals on or about the 7th day of January, 1998).
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into question JOHNSON'S mental capacity to stand trial. On or about the 29th day of
January, 1997, JOHNSON'S attorney petitioned the court for a competency evaluation
and the same was ordered to be conducted pursuant to UCA § 77-15-5 (1953, as
amended) (see R. at 13-23).
JOHNSON filed a bar complaint against his appointed counsel, who on the 5th
day of March, 1997, withdrew (see R. at 24). JOHNSON was appointed successor
counsel, Karlin Myers, on April 15,1997. On or about 12th day of May, 1997, successor
counsel moved to withdraw and to appoint a guardian, stating that the Defendant could
not adequately act in his own best interests (see R. at 35-36).5
On or about the 16th day of May, 1997, a status hearing was held which also
addressed appointed counsel's motion to withdraw (see R. at 41). At the hearing,
JOHNSON asserted that he thought the matter could proceed to trial.6 The Court

5

The affidavit of Karlin Myers provides some basis for his concern. He
states that the Defendant refused to talk about his case, requested a pistol to shoot
his way out of the jail, made numerous threats regarding individuals in the jail and
his former attorney, was delusional about the practices of a certain religion,
believed that his cell mate was attempting to murder him by putting cyanide in his
toothpaste, believed that the Judge and law enforcement officers were members of
a kidnapping, murdering and child abusing subversive organization, and generally
would not assist his attorney in trial preparation (see R. at 38-40).
6

There appears to have been no followup adjudicative hearing to determine
whether or not the Defendant was competent or incompetent, as required pursuant
to UCA § 77-15-6 (1953, as amended), and it is unclear from the record as to
whether the initial petition regarding competency was withdrawn or the defense of
diminished mental capacity waived, and if such be the case, the record is void of
any finding or conclusion determining that the Defendant was capable of making
such withdrawal or waiver. While two analysts were appointed and each generated
a report in which they opined that the Defendant was competent to stand trial, the
same were not made a part of record, were not reviewed through any adjudicative
proceeding, and at least one of the analysts recommended that new counsel be
appointed.
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granted counsel's motion to withdraw, but appointed said counsel to be present at trial
to act as standby counsel, denied the Defendant's motion for appointment of guardian,
and indicated that it was not satisfied with the Defendant's knowledge of what was
going on (see R. at 41).
On or about the 3 1 * day of July, 1997, JOHNSON executed a notice and request
for disposition of pending charges and the same was filed with the Kane County Court
on August 14,1997 (see R. at 51).
At trial, JOHNSON was allowed to represent himself and KARLIN MYERS
(hereafter "MYERS") was present, acting as standby counsel (see trial transcript at
page 1). MYERS participated by assisting throughout the trial proceedings and gave
the closing argument for the defense (Id. at page 112). There is no indication as to
whether or not JOHNSON attempted to subpeona witnesses to call in his behalf.
However, JOHNSON'S inadequacy to represent himself is apparent since he did not
even have his mother testify, who was a witness to the incident. In addition, there were
two potential witnesses, TOM BROWN and MIKE CARUSO, who were witnesses to the
incident and were disclosed at preliminary hearing. However, JOHNSON may not have
been made aware of these witnesses since he appears to not have even been aware
that there was a preliminary hearing (see preliminary hearing transcript at page 18).
The witnesses at trial consisted of JOHNSON, three of the five peace officers that
forcibly restrained JOHNSON, and the Corrections Officer that denied JOHNSON mail
on the day prior to the incident. The statements of the officers were inconsistent as to
the particulars regarding the instruction JOHNSON was given prior to entering his cell;
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the number of times it was given; the specific facts of who JOHNSON actually struck, if
anybody; and, the reasons and the procedures upon which the officers relied in taking
said necessary restraint. The evidence presented at trial was conclusive and
uncontroverted as to the involvement of no others except JOHNSON and the five peace
officers. If an assault occurred, it was against a peace officer, while said officer was
acting within the scope of his authority. At trial, JOHNSON presented no jury
instructions or jury verdict form which proposed to preserve the defense of diminished
mental capacity. However, he did object to the instruction for the offense of assault by
a prisoner as being ambiguous (see trial transcript at page 98).
The jury returned a verdict and dismissed both counts of assault against a
Corrections Officer, and found JOHNSON guilty of ASSAULT BY A PRISONER, a Third
Degree Felony. JOHNSON was sentenced the same day, having waived the right to
wait at least the minimum time period before sentencing, but requesting that a
Presentence Investigation Report be done (trial transcript at page 126). Appointed
stand-by counsel participated in the sentencing process and recommended that the
sentence run concurrent. However, he did not present for the Court's consideration for
the option to sentence on the lesser offense of Assault on a Corrections Officer, arising
out of a single criminal episode, as provided pursuant to UCA § 76-1-401, et seq.,
(1953, as amended).
The Court sentenced JOHNSON to the indeterminate sentence of zero to five
years, to run concurrently with the previous sentences which JOHNSON was serving
(R. at 103-104). However, the Court reserved jurisdiction to reconsider its sentence
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upon Defendant's written notice to be filed before October 15,1997. Defendant filed a
motion to reconsider the judgment (R. at 109), which the court denied, asserting that
the reservation of jurisdiction was as to the sentence and not the conviction (R. at 117).
JOHNSON filed his won appeal on September 26,1997 (R. at 105).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT NO. 1
The trial court erred in going forward with the preliminary hearing, even though
appointed counsel represented that Defendant has specifically requested not to be in
court for the preliminary hearing. Counsel failed to provide any reason or justification
for such absence and the same appears irrational and falls below the standard of
objective reasonableness in representation. The preliminary hearing is a critical stage
in the criminal process and proper consideration for a defendant's constitutional rights
must be observed. The standard for waiver of attendance at a preliminary hearing
should be the same as a waiver of preliminary examination, which means that the same
should either be in writing or in person in open court. The state, the defendant and the
court each have an interest in seeing that the Defendant is present at preliminary
hearing.
ARGUMENT NO. 2
The trial court erred in failing to follow through on its examination of Defendant's
competency and was an essential consideration with regard to both the Defendant
being competent to stand trial as well as his serving as his own legal counsel. The
determination as to a Defendant's competency to stand trial is ultimately a mixed
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question of law and fact. The trial court failed to follow through and comply with the
statutory requirements, which require an evidentiary hearing, findings of fact and
conclusions of law once the order for a competency evaluation had been executed.
The circumstances of the present case present a substantial question of possible doubt
as to the Defendant's competency. When there is a substantial question of possible
doubt as to a Defendant's competency, the trial court must hold a hearing to determine
the Defendant's present competency.
ARGUMENT NO. 3
The Defendant did not receive effective assistance of legal counsel through the
pretrial proceedings or at trial by utilization of standby counsel. A claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel is considered in review of the totality of the circumstances and
the complete context in which possible attorney error occurred. The Strickland test is
one of objective reasonableness and a showing of prejudice to the Defendant. The
representation of the Defendant in this case falls below objective reasonableness,
which in fact prejudiced the Defendant in his defense. The appointment of standby
counsel indicates that the court was suspicious of defendant's level of competency, but
was an ineffective measure to ensure Defendant's right to effective legal counsel.
ARGUMENT NO. 4
The Defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial where the charges arose in
October of 1996 and did not go to trial until September of 1997. Statutory provision for
justifiable delay pending competency evaluation is not applicable since the trial court
failed to follow through with such proceedings and there was never an adjudication
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hearing held regarding the Defendant's competency and the statutory stay of further
proceedings was not observed. The Defendant gave notice to assert his right to a
speedy trial in July of 1997, but was fundamentally entitled to the same since his arrest
had occurred in October of the previous year, placing the delay beyond the scope of
trial settings within the normal course. This should have triggered a heightened
scrutiny of the delay that denied the Defendant of his constitutional right to a speedy
trial.
ARGUMENT NO. 5
The trial court erred in refusing to clarify the jury instruction that the Defendant
opposed and by failing to include additional instructions fundamental to the case.
Close scrutiny of the elements instructions of the charges of assault of a corrections
officer and assault by a prisoner show that essential elements are missing in the one
which led to confusion in understanding the other, misleading the jury about the proper
principles of law and, when taken as whole, do not fairly instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case, but constitute fundamental error.
ARGUMENT NO. 6
The instant case exemplifies inconsistent verdicts on various counts of assault
and which resulted in the acquittal on at least one of the charges where the evidence
presented at trial is irreconcilable as to the distinction. Therefore, the evidence
presented at trial must be found insufficient to establish guilty of the Defendant of the
offense that the jury found him guilty, assault by a prisoner. The facts of the case are
uncontroverted and establish that those present during the incident were the Defendant
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and five officers and no others. If any assault occurred, it had to have occurred against
an officer. Where the jury convicted on the crime of assault by a prisoner, but acquitted
on the separate counts of the assault of a corrections officer, under the circumstances
of this case, the same are inconsistent verdicts, which cannot be reconciled by the
evidence.
ARGUMENT NO. 7
It was error to sentence the Defendant without first appointing legal counsel and
not requiring the preparation of a presentence report. The appointment of standby
counsel is ineffective in assisting defendant at sentencing. The Defendant is entitled to
the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing to ensure compliance with due
process requirements. Standby counsel failed to consider a reduction of the charge as
involving a single criminal episode, but which was overlooked by both the court and
counsels at the time of sentencing. The Defendant requested a presentence
investigation report, which, under the circumstances of this case, would have provided
the court with further information as to the Defendant's background and his possible
diminished mental capacity for purposes of sentencing. To sentence without the
benefit of a presentence investigation report under such circumstances is an abuse of
the trial court's discretion.
///
///
///
///
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ARUGMENTS
ARGUMENT NO. 1
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GOING FORWARD WITH
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WHERE THE DEFENDANT
WAS NOT PRESENT, NOT COMMUNICATING WITH
COUNSEL AND NO WRITTEN WAIVER OF APPEARANCE
HAD BEEN SUBMITTED.
The preliminary hearing in this matter was conducted on or about the 21 st day of
November, 1996. The Defendant was represented by appointed counsel, Floyd Holm.
Mr. Holm asserted on the record that the Defendant specifically requested not to be in
court for preliminary hearing (see preliminary hearing transcript, Page 3). However, it
is unclear as to what trial purpose would be served by not having JOHNSON present.
The absence of the Defendant from such proceedings is irrational and falls below the
standard of object reasonableness in representation, unless some trial object could be
realized by such absence. The record makes no reference to the reason for such
absence. While the preliminary hearing is not a full blown determination of an
accused's guilt or innocence, it is none the less a "critical stage" in the criminal
process, and the proper consideration for a defendant's constitutional rights must be
observed. See State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d at 646. See also State v. Anderson. 612
P.2d at 782, n. 9, citing Coleman v. Alabama. 399 U.S. 1, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 26 L. Ed. 2d
387(1969).
If the defendant's absence from preliminary hearing was in fact a planned trial
strategy then the waiver of appearance should have been made by the Defendant in
person or in writing, setting forth the basis for the non-appearance. If the Defendant in
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this case had waived the preliminary examination, the same should have been done in
writing or personally in open court. The same standard should be applied to the waiver
of appearance by the Defendant at preliminary hearing. A preliminary examination,
unless waived by an accused, with consent of the State, is a prerequisite to a
prosecution by information. See State v. Sommers. 592 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1979).
Similarly, the State has an interest in seeing that the Defendant is present during
preliminary hearing. There is nothing in the record which indicates that the State
consented to Defendant's non-appearance at preliminary hearing. Never the less, the
purpose of the right to a preliminary hearing is to secure to the accused, before he is
brought to trial under an information, the right to be advised of the nature of the
accusation against him, and to be confronted with and given the opportunity to cross
examine the witnesses testifying on behalf of the State. See State v. Sommers. 597
P.2d at 1347; see also State v. Jensen. 34 Utah 166, 96 P. 1085 (1908). The very
nature of preliminary examination fundamentally suggests the right of the accused to
personally confront his accusers, observe their demeanor, the nature of their
accusation, and the basis upon which the accuser may rely, and then, at the same time,
provide an opportunity to test the validity of the testimony and the credibility of the
witnesses presented in the State's case. This, by and large, cannot be accomplished
without the presence of the Defendant at the hearing.
There is a third party who has an interest in seeing that the Defendant is present
at preliminary hearing; that is, the Court. At preliminary hearing, the Court determines
whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and also
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that the defendant was the one who committed the crime. The trial court is entitled to
consider the evidence presented by the State, the reasonable inferences drawn from
the evidence, and is further entitled to consider the demeanor of the Defendant. As a
result, the Defendant believes that is was error to go forward with the preliminary
hearing under the circumstances of this case, where the Defendant was not personally
present, made no express waiver on the record, either in writing or orally, and where
counsel's representation failed to provide some reason for the Defendant's nonappearance as part of a trial strategy.
ARGUMENT NO. 2
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FOLLOW
THROUGH ON THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANT'S
COMPETENCY, WITH REGARD TO BOTH BEING
TRIED AS A DEFENDANT IN THE CASE AS WELL
AS SERVING AS HIS OWN LEGAL COUNSEL.
In the instant case, there was much to suggest that the Defendant was
incompetent to stand trial, incapable of serving as his own attorney, was suffering from
mental illness of a delusional prosecutor type that rendered him incapable of
adequately assisting in his own defense. The determination as to a Defendant's
competency to stand trial is ultimately a mixed question of law and of fact. See State v.
Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239, on reconsideration, 776 P.2d 631 (Utah 1988). When
reviewing mixed findings of fact and law, the appellate court is free to make its
independent determination of the trial court's conclusions; however, the trial court's
factual findings should not be set aside on appeal, unless clearly erroneous. See
State. Department of Human Resources, ex. rel. Parker, v. Irizarrv. 945 P.2d 676 (Utah
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1997). Notwithstanding, in the instant case, the trial court error arises from its failure to
follow through and comply with the statutory requirements of Utah Code Annotated §
77-15-1 et. seq. (1953, as amended).
The record shows that JOHNSON often times acted irrationally, requiring the
use of restraining devices such as a straight jacket, for his own safety and the safety of
others. JOHNSON would become disorderly and throw objects in order to get attention.
JOHNSON was initially evaluated by Dennis Jones of SouthWest Center whose
impression was that JOHNSON suffered from delusions of a prosecutor type (see R. at
10). A petition for a competency evaluation was filed with the court in conjunction with
these proceedings (see R. at 13-23), and the trial court ordered such evaluation.
Thereafter, JOHNSON was uncooperative and threatening to two different attorneys
appointed to represent him, forcing each to withdraw and in each case appointed
counsel questioned the competency of said Defendant. The affidavit of Karl in Myers,
after providing the basis for his conclusion, giving examples such as provided in
footnote 5 infra, states that the Defendant could not adequately act in his own best
interests (see R. at 35-36). Even the trial court appears to have some reservation as to
JOHNSON'S capacity and for that reason appoints Myers to serve as standby counsel
(see R. at 41). The practice of appointment of standby counsel seems to be
questionable at best, since the same is not provided for under the rules of criminal
procedure. However, under the circumstances of this case, even if the practice were
condoned generally, its utilization is improper and falls below the Strickland standard,
virtually insuring that such counsel's performance will be deficient and the propensity
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for making serious errors in the case so likely that counsel in fact is not functioning as
the counsel guaranteed to the defendant by the sixth amendment. Moreover, the
practice and use of the appointment of standby counsel simply is not effective in
insuring that one who has potentially a diminished mental capacity from effectively
representing himself during the proceedings.
It appears that the court ordered a competency evaluation of JOHNSON.
Notwithstanding, there is no indication of a competency hearing or follow-up
determination or finding as to what had transpired subsequently. The order ordering
the competency evaluation indicated that a competency hearing would be heard upon
the receipt of the examiner's report. In Utah Code Annotated § 77-15-5(9) it states:
When the report is received, the Court shall set a date
for a mental hearing which shall be held in not less than
five and not more than fifteen days, unless the Court
enlarges the time for good cause. The hearing shall be
conducted according to procedures outlined in subsection
62(a)-12-234(9)(b) through (9)(f).
It is unclear whether such a hearing was held or whether it was held in the
absence of JOHNSON. Such a determination is also important regarding the date of
the hearing, since § 7, effectively provides for a stay of such period of time from the
computation of determining the Defendant's speedy trial rights. It states:
(1) The statute of limitations is tolled during any period
in which the defendant is adjudicated incompetent to proceed.
(2) Any period of time during which the defendant has
been adjudicated incompetent and any period during which he
is being evaluated for competecy may not be computed in
determining the defendant's speed trial rights. (Emphasis added).
///
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Without findings or a determination of competency, with dates and particulars, it
is difficult to assess whether the Defendant's right to a speed trial or other due process
rights have been protected. It seems clear that under the circumstances of this case,
the trial court should have followed through with the petition of competency and held a
competency hearing, and made appropriate findings and conclusions accordingly.
While it is statutorially provided that the burden is upon the defendant to establish
grounds for incompetency or diminished mental capacity, the defendant is entitled to
the procedural, statutory and due process considerations of following the established
statutory procedure. Since the Defendant was not provided with such procedure, he
should not be held to having the burden of proof that may have arisen from such
procedure. Rather, it is error that the trial court failed to follow through with procedural
and statutory procedures. When there is a substantial question of possible doubt as to
a defendant's competency..., the trial court must hold a hearing to determine the
defendant's present competency.... See State v. Holland. 281 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah

1996).
ARGUMENT NO. 3
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF LEGAL COUNSEL THROUGH THE
PROCEEDINGS OR AT TRIAL BY THE UTILIZATION
OF STANDBY COUNSEL.
This court has previously determined that in analyzing the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, it must review the totality of the circumstances and the complete
context in which possible attorney error occurred. See State v. Pursifell. 746 P.2d 270
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(Utah App. 1987). The appellate courts generally apply the Strickland test, that is, (1)
counsels representation falls below "objective reasonableness", resulting in (2)
prejudice to the Defendant. See Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 690,104
S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). See also State v. Harper. 761 P.2d 570
(Utah App. 1988).
In the instant case, representation was ineffective from the very beginning.
JOHNSON was non-cooperative and suspected of suffering from mental illness or
diminished mental capacity. He was not present at preliminary hearing and in fact was
not aware that a preliminary hearing had been held, as evidenced by comments made
by the Defendant in the filing of his docketing statement. The notion that the Defendant
be absent from preliminary hearing and then have a separate attorney appointed as
standby counsel while he represents himself makes no sense as a legal strategy and
falls well below the Strickland standard of objective reasonableness which prejudices
the Defendant. The Defendant was prejudiced first by being denied the opportunity to
personally observe and cross-examine the witnesses at preliminary hearing and to be
made aware of any discovery that came to light during the process, such as the names
of two potential witnesses, Tom Brown and Mike Caruso, and their relationship, if any,
with the Kane County Correctional Facility. Defendant was prejudiced by his own
possible delusionment. Since Defendant believed that he was capable of representing
himself and was competent to stand trial, the prospective use of diminished mental
capacity as a potential defense was either completely ignored or forgotten. Even
///
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though the same represents perhaps the most logical explanation for the Defendant's
erratic behavior, which led to the charges being filed.
The appointment of standby counsel offers nothing of substance to the
protection of the Defendant's constitutional right to effective legal representation. As
standby counsel, the attorney is generally required to simply appear on the date of trial
to assist the Defendant in procedural issues, such as objections, jury voir dire, etc.
Standby counsel is generally not involved in deciding which witnesses need to be
subpoenaed for the defense. Standby counsel is generally not involved in the
suppression of evidence that may have been wrongfully obtained in the investigation of
the case. Standby counsel is typically unaware of what transpired at preliminary
hearing or other related proceedings. He comes into the case without having full
knowledge of the discovery done by the defense or a full disclosure of the State's
position in the case. In short, standby counsel is simply not in a position to provide
adequate representation. He is not involved in either the trial strategy or the
preparation of the case. He is not fully advised of the circumstances of the case to
provide effective counseling or representation. Even worse, his representation is
characteristically flawed by errors in judgment that arise by reason of his limited
exposure to the case, the client, the witnesses and surrounding circumstances
pertaining the introduction of evidence and the trial process all in the context and
before a presiding jury or judge that is deciding upon the guilt or innocence of the
Defendant and in doing so must overlook or set aside the very natural human suspicion
of why a defense attorney is there, but not actually representing the Defendant.
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The instant case is further complicated by the fact that the trial judge even
suspected that the Defendant did not fully understand the nature of the proceedings
and for that reason appointed standby counsel (see R. at 41). Even if standby counsel
were determined a reasonable alternative where the issue of competency had not been
raised, it is clearly not a device that should be resorted to for representation of the
incapacitated. The standby counsel in a criminal case would not be qualified or
capable of serving both as defense attorney and guardian for one who is incapacitated,
insane, mentally ill or suffers from diminished mental capacity.
ARGUMENT NO. 4
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A
SPEEDY TRIAL.
This incident arises on the 18th and 19th days of October, 1996. The Defendant
at the time was incarcerated, awaiting trial on other offenses. Those offenses went to
trial in July of 1997. The Defendant was convicted on two counts involving marijuana
and paraphernalia and thereafter executed a notice and request for disposition of
pending charges on July 31,1997, the same was filed with the Kane County Court on
August 14,1997 (see R. at 51), and the matter went to trial on the 16th day of
September, 1997. This Court has, in State v. Hovt. 806 P.2d 204 (Utah App. 1991),
when deciding whether a Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been
violated, it must balance four fact sensitive factors; length of delay; reason for delay;
Defendant's assertion of his right; and prejudice to the Defendant. In Hovt. the court
further indicated that the period of time between the Defendant's arrest and trial in
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excess of the statutory directive may well be a "triggering mechanism" for heightened
scrutiny for a claim that Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been
denied (]d. at 207). See also Barker v. Winao. 407 U.S. 514, 530 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2 '92,
33 L Ed. 2d 101 (1972).
In the instant case, one of the reasons for the delay was the pending
competency matter involving the Defendant. However, since there was no adjudication
of competency and no determination reduced to findings or conclusions, use of the
statute for purposes of staying Defendant's right to a speedy right is misplaced, even
though the statute clearly provides for such a stay until adjudication can be made as to
competency. In other words, if the stay applied, it should provide as well to further
judicial proceeding of the court, including the trial. Since there was no hearing, findings
or conclusions after the petition had been filed and the court's order to undergo
competency evaluation executed, all further proceedings should have been stayed.
The Defendant did ultimately give notice to assert his right to a speedy trial in
July of 1997, but was fundamentally entitled to a speedy trial, having waited for trial
since October of the previous year, well beyond the time period normally taken in
setting trials within the normal course. The Defendant was prejudiced by the delay. In
representing himself and being in jail at the same time, he was not afforded the
opportunity to make full, complete or timely discovery in the case and he had no
reasonable opportunity to investigate his case or contact potential witnesses in the
case, he had no opportunity to examine the premises where the altercation occurred or
to explore the policies and procedures utilized by the facility in the management of
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disorderly inmates at the Kane County Correctional Facility. The passage of time
diminished the Defendant's ability to be able to properly prepare for trial, while the
State had preserved its case through the use of written statements and testimony
cultivated at the preliminary hearing. The Defendant was further prejudiced by not
having been present at the preliminary hearing.
ARGUMENT NO. 5
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CLARIFY
THE JURY INSTRUCTION THAT THE DEFENDANT
OPPOSED AND BY FAILING TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL
INSTRUCTIONS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE CASE.
In the instant case, the Defendant offered no jury instructions of his own.
Standby counsel offered no jury instructions. Neither offered jury instructions or a jury
verdict form that purported to preserve the defense of diminished mental capacity in the
case. The Defendant was involved in deliberation over the jury instruction. While there
does not appear to be a case on point in the State of Utah, the standard for clarity in
jury instructions is higher than that for a statute. See State v. LaFaber. 913 P.2d 369,
128 Wash. 2d 896, reconsideration denied (Wash. 1996). In Utah, jury instructions are
reviewed in their entirety and when the instructions, taken as a whole fairly instruct the
jury on the law applicable to the case, they are affirmed. See State v. Robertson. 932
P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997). A jury instruction will not be found to be defective absent a
showing that the instruction confused or misled the jury about the proper principles of
law. See Marauez v. State. 941 P.2d 22 (Wyo. 1997). However, failure to give any
instruction on the essential elements of a criminal offense is fundamental error,
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requiring reversal of Defendant's conviction, as it is a confusing and misleading
instruction. See Compton v. State. 931 P.2d 936 (Wyo. 1997).
In the instant case, JOHNSON objected to the instruction regarding the elements
of the offense of assault by a prisoner, found as instruction number 17a, (see R. at 84)
to the extent that the same made reference to threatening conduct. Refer to paragraph
1 (b). Since the Defendant believed that the word "threaten" would be confusing to the
jury because it would attempt to prosecute someone for the thought (see trial transcript
at 98). When the instruction is viewed in the context of instruction given for assault of a
correctional officer, instruction number 17b (see R. at 83), it appears that the
Defendant's argument had some merit. There can be no denying that the elements of
assault by a prisoner and assault on a correctional officer are the same, at least from
the standpoint of the assault itself. However, the language that were given in the two
instructions are substantially different and confusing in comparison. The returns on the
verdict further indicate confusion with the instructions as the Defendant was found
guilty of assault by a prisoner, but found not guilty of assault on a corrections officer,
even though the facts are uncontroverted in establishing that if any assault did occur, it
had to have occurred against a corrections officer. The instructions, taken as whole,
and viewed in their entirety, did not fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law and led
to the confusion which resulted in inconsistent jury verdicts.
///
///
///
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ARGUMENT NO. 6
WHERE THE JURY VERDICTS WERE INCONSISTENT
AS TO THE VARIOUS COUNTS OF ASSAULT, THE
WHICH RESULTED IN ACQUITTAL ON AT LEAST SOME
OF THE CHARGES. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT
TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH GUILT OF
THE DEFENDANT ON THE OFFENSE OF ASSAULT
BY A PRISONER.
The dilemma presented in the instant case is readily apparent without a great
deal of marshaling of the evidence. In fact, the evidence is, for the most part,
uncontroverted and can be considered by the Court on a wholesale basis entirely from
the standpoint of the State's case. The uncontroverted evidenced presented by the
state establishes clearly that there were no others that could have possibly been
assaulted except for the officers involved in the incident. If an assault occurred, it had
to have occurred upon an officer. Consequently the jury verdicts are inconsistent. The
test for assessing inconsistency in jury verdicts is whether the jury had to rely on the
same evidence in producing two apparently inconsistent conclusions. See People v.
Quinn. 794 P.2d 1066 (Colo. App. 1990). That is clearly the case here. The jury has to
rely upon exactly the same evidence to consider the issue of assault by a prisoner as it
does to consider to the issue of assault on a corrections officer. If two criminal offenses
arise out of the same transaction and are charged in separate counts and one offense
includes elements or acts necessary to the commission of the other, the jury verdicts
are inconsistent if the jury convicts on one and acquits on the other. See State v.
Culver. 657 P.2d 622, 36 Wash. App. 524, reviewed denied (Wash. App. 1984).
///
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While the elements of both offenses involved in the instant case are virtually
identical, the one requires that the Defendant be a prisoner and the other requires that
the assaulted be an officer. Notwithstanding, there is no dispute in the evidence
presented in this case that those elements of each offense were met, since those
involved included the Defendant as a prisoner and corrections officers.
It is important to note that in setting forth the elements of the offense of assault
on a correctional officer, the state did not include all of the essential elements of the
offense and therefore the Defendant believes that the same is in fundamental error
because it is a confusing and misleading instruction. That does not, however, diminish
the reality that this same jury found there to be insufficient evidence to convict on the
offense of assault on a corrections officer and therefore, under the circumstances of
this case, the Defendant argues that the evidence must be insufficient to convict on the
offense of assault by a prisoner, since the two offenses have the same essential
elements relating to assault.
ARGUMENT NO. 7
IT WAS ERROR TO SENTENCE THE DEFENDANT
WITHOUT FIRST APPOINTING LEGAL COUNSEL AND
NOT REQUIRING THE PREPARATION OF A
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT.
In the instant case, the Defendant was sentenced directly after conviction. He
had represented himself at trial, with the assistance of standby counsel. Standby
counsel participated in providing the closing argument for the defense. The Defendant
waived his right to wait at least two days sentencing, but requested that a presentence
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investigation report be done (see trial transcript at 126). Standby counsel did argue
that the charge should run concurrent with other charges that the Defendant was
serving at the time. However, assistance of legal counsel was ineffective in failing to
suggest the more appropriate disposition of reduction to a lesser charge where the
matter involved counts arising from a single criminal episode as provided pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-401 et. seq. (1953, as amended).
The Defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing to
ensure compliance with the due process requirements. See State v. Gomez. 887 P.2d
853 (Utah 1994). In analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court of
appeals must review the totality of circumstances in complete context in which possible
attorney error occurred. See State v. Harper. 761 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1988). Since
this matter involved a single criminal episode where two offenses arose, one a third
degree felony and the other a class A misdemeanor, with the same essential elements
to the offense, the Defendant was entitled to the court's consideration of sentencing on
the lesser, but not necessarily included, offense, even though the Defendant had been
acquitted of that same offense at trial. The Defendant was entitled to such
consideration at the time of sentencing. This issue was not raised or considered by the
Court or standby counsel, or the State, and the Defendant was clearly prejudiced by the
such non-consideration.
In addition, the circumstances in this case strongly suggest that the Defendant
would have had a broad range of mitigating considerations, such as his present mental
or psychological condition and as a result further presentencing investigating was
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appropriate and should have been ordered. The presentence investigation report
offers a broad range of factors for the court's consideration and without such, the court
is limited to simply the commitment of the defendant to prison, which is what the court
did in the instant case.
The only benefit that was supposedly derived from the immediate sentencing of
the Defendant was consideration of the concurrent sentencing, which was a
consideration that could have been taken into account as part of the presentence
investigation process. The ordering of the presentence investigation report is typically
considered to be discretionary. Notwithstanding, the Defendant asserts that the court's
sentencing without benefit of a presentence investigation report is an abuse of such
discretion when the same would have provided the court with further background in a
case where there is a strong indication of diminished mental capacity.
CONCLUSION
On the grounds and for the reasons stated above, it is requested that the
Judgment on the Verdict be reversed as to the offense of ASSAULT BY A PRISONER,
to be consistent with the jury's determination and verdict as to the other charges at trial,
and as supported by the evidence, together with such other and further relief as this
Court deems appropriate.
DATED this

day of

19

.

JOHN E. HUMMEL, attorney for Defendant
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ADDENDUM

Utah Code Unannotated § 76-5-102.5 and 102-6
Utah Code Unannotated § 77-15
n
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76-6-410
76-5-411.

Child victim of sexual abuse as competent
witness.
Admissibility of out-of-court statement of child
victim of sexual abuse.
Part5

HIV "I es ting — Sexual C)1*1 f n ril i
76-5-501.
76-6-602.
76-5-503.
76 5 504.

Ill \" Il

s

Definitions.
Mandatory testing — Liability for costs.
Voluntary testing — Victim to request — Cc
paid by Crime Victim Reparations.
i Ictim notification and counseling.
PARTI

ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES
78.6-101. "Prisoner" defined.
For purposes of this part "prisoner" means any person who
is in custody of a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or
who is confined in a jail or other penal institution or a facility
used for confinement of delinquent juveniles operated by the
Division of Youth Corrections regardless of whether the confinement is legal.
1M4

ID; me neaitn care provider or basic life support worker ]
was performing emergency or life saving duties within the j
scope of his authority at the time of the assault.
(2) As used in this section:
(a) "Basic life support worker" has the same meoninr'
as "basic life support personnel" provided in Section |
26-8-2.
(b) "Health care prcn icier" has the meaning as provided j
in Section 7B-U-3.
m\
f> ii I, Aggravated assault.
vl) A person commits aggravated assault i( lie commiti
issauit as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury f o smother; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violations';
Subsection (lXa), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to p
death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felonjt
(3) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a third degree felonji

76-5-103.5. Aggravated a s s a u l t b y prisoner.
(1) Any prisoner, not serving a sentence for a capital L..^.
or a felony of the first degree, who commits aggravated
is guilty of:
76-5-102. A s s a u l t
(a) a felony of the second degree if no serious bodfy]
(1) Assault is:
injury was intentionally caused; or
(a) an attempt, with uiiluvi (ul loiu mi i. mli'iiii, to do
(b) a felony of the first degree if serious bodily i
bodily injury to another;
was intentionally caused.
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force
or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(2) Any prisoner serving a sentence for a capital felony or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, felony of the first degree who commita' aggravated assault
that causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to guilty of:
another.
(a) a felony of the first degree if no serious bodily
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor
was intentionally caused; or
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes
(b) a capital felony if serious bodily injury was int:
substantial bodily injury to another.
tionally caused.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused
(3) For the purpose of this section, "serving a senl
caused serious bodily injury to another.
iws means sentenced and committed to the custody of the
ment of Corrections, the sentence has not been terminated
76-5-102.3. Assault against school employees.
voided, and the prisoner is:
••
(1) Any person who assaults an employee of a public or
(a) not on parole; or
private school, with knowledge that the individual is an
(b) in custody after arrest for a parole violation.
employee, and when the employee is acting within the scope of
his authority as an employee, is guilty of a class A misde- 76-5,104. Consensual a l t e r c a t i o n n o defense to hi
meanor.
ctde or assault if dangerous weapor
(2) As used in this section, "employee" includes a volunteer.
participants are engaged in an ultin
1993
ing match.
In
any
prosecution
for criminal homicide under raj
70-6-102.4. Assault against peace officer.
this chapter or assault, it is no defense to the prosecution
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge
the defendant was a party to any duel, mutual comb
that he is a peace officer, and when the peace officer is acting
other consensual altercation if during the course of the
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer, is guilty of
combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon as defin*
a class A misdemeanor.
1M7
Section 76-1-601 was used or if the defendant was enga?
an ultimate fighting match as defined in Section 76-f»-7f
76-5-102.5. Assault b y prisoner.
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause
bodily injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
1974
76-5-105. Mayhem.
[(1)1 Every person who unlawfully and intentionally
76-5*102.6. Assault on ii correctional officer.
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material prives a human being of a member of his body, or
or any other substance or object at a peace or correctional renders it useless, or who cuts out or disables the tongue,
officer is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
ifti out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of
(2) Mayhem is a felony of the second degree.
76-5-102.7. Assault against health care provie
iiiiicl
basic life support worker — Penalty.
76 6 Iff. Harassment.
(1) A person who assaults a health care provider or basic
(1) A person is guilty of harassment if, with
life support worker is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if:
frighten or harass another, he communicates a
(a) the person knew that the victim was a health care recorded threat to commit any violent felony.
provider or basic life support worker; and
(2) Harassment is a class B misdemeanor.

wfeft

( D A defendant, whether or not written demand has been
made, who intends to offer evidence of an alibi shall, not less
than ten days before trial or at such other time as the court
may allow, file and.serve on the prosecuting attorney a notice,
in writing, of his intention to claim nlibi. The notice shall
contain specific information as to the place where the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and,
as particularly a s is known to the defendant or his attorney,
the names and addresses of the witnesses by whom h e
proposes to establish alibi. The prosecuting attorney, not more
than five days after receipt of the list provided herein or at
such other time as the court may direct, shall file and serve the
defendant with the addresses, as particularly as are known to
him, of the witnesses the state proposes to offer to contradict
or impeach the defendant's alibi evidence.
(2) The defendant and prosecuting attorney shall be under
a continuing duty to disclose the names and addresses of
additional witnesses which come to the attention of eithei
party after filing their alibi witness lists.
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney fails to comply
with the requirements of this section, the court may exclude
evidence offered to establish or rebut alibi. However, the
defendant m a y always testify on his own behalf concerning
alibi.
(4) The court may, for good cause show n, waii e the require
ments of this section
iff©
77-14-3. Testimony regarding mental state of defendant or another — Notice requirements —
Right to examination.
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any
expert to testify at trial or at any hearirig regarding the
mental state of the defendant or another, the party
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the
opposing party as soon as practicable but not less than 3 0
days before trial or ten days before any hearing at which
the testimony is offered. Notice shall include the name
and address of the expert, the experts curriculum vitae,
and a copy of the expert's report.
(b) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to
the proposed testimony. If the expert has not prepared a
report or the report does not adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony
including any opinion and the bases and reasons of that
opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall
provide a written explanation of the experts anticipated
testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate
notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a copy
of any report prepared by the expert when available.
(2) As soon as practicable after receipt of the experts
report, the party receiving notice shall provide notice to the
other party of witnesses whom the party anticipates calling to
rebut the experts testimony, including the name and address
of any expert witness and the experts curriculum vitae. If
available, a report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided. If
the rebuttal expert has not prepared a report or the report
does not adequately inform concerning the substance of the
expert's proposed rebuttal testimony, or in the event the
witness is not an expert, the party intending to call the
rebuttal witness shall provide a written explanation of the
witness's anticipated rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the
opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by any
rebuttal expert when available.
(3) If the prosecution or the defense proposes to introduce
testimony of an expert which is based upon personal contact,
interview, observation, or psychological testing of the defendant, testimony of an expert involving a mental diagnosis of
the defendant,, or testimony of an expert that the defendant,

opposing party shall have a corresponding right to have ittl
own expert examine and evaluate the defendant.
m
(A) This section applies to any trial, sentencing hearinf,!
and other hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing, whetberl
or not the defendant proposes to offer evidence of the defwwg
of insanity or diminished mental capacity.
au
(5) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet UKR
requirements of this section, the opposing party shall btl
entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient a
allow preparation to meet the testimony. If the court finds thttS
the failure to comply with this section is the result of bad faitkl
on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall iroposl
appropriate sanctions.
i
(6) This section may not require the admission of evideoefl
not otherwise admissible.
iwl
77-14-4. Insanity or diminished; mental capacity — N i l
tice requirement.
*m
(1) If a defendant proposes to offer evidence that he is noil
guilty as a result of insanity or that he had diminished raenUil
capacity, he shall file and serve the prosecuting attorney witkl
written notice of his intention to claim the defense at the timl
of arraignment or as soon afterward as practicable, but notj
fewer than 3 0 days before the trial.
.M
(2) If the court receives notice that a defendant intends M
claim that he is not guilty by reason of insanity or that he hail
diminished mental capacity, the court shall proceed in aroM
dance with the requirements described in Section 77-16a-30lJ
7 7-14-5,77-14-6.6. Repealed.

l«J

77.14.6, Entrapment — Notice of claim required.
1
Notice of a claim of entrapment shall be given by thin
defendant in accord with Section 76-2-303.
Mtffl
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$
Incompetent person not to be punished for crim J
"Incompetent to proceed" defined.
1
Petition for inquiry as to defendant or prisoner—a
Filing — Contents.
1
Court may raise issue of competency at any tira*
Order for hearing — Stay of other proceeding Examinations of defendant — Scope of 'xan» J
nation and report.
|
Commitment on finding of incompetency to steaL J
trial — Subsequent hearings — Notice to pmA
ecu ting attorneys.
y
Statute of limitations and speedy trial — E M . ]
of incompetency of defendant.
j
Bail exonerated on commitment of defendant a
Expenses.
J

77-15-1. Incompetent per
1111 ml I mi line
m l
crime.
'9
No person who is incompetent In imiiffd shall he fried U
punished for a public offense
llfl
77-15-2. "Incompetent to proceed" defined.
,jfl
For the purposes of this chapter, a person is incompetent 9
proceed if he is suffering from a mental disorder or OMBH
retardation resulting either in:
43
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual raddfl
standing of the proceedings against him or of the punajfl
' ment specified for the offense charged; 01*
: ifl

01, His in Ability to consult with his counsel and to
rtibpate in the proceedings against him with a reasonKdsgree of rational understanding.
1994
£ 1 Petition for inquiry as t o d e f e n d a n t o r pris$ oner — Filing — Contents.
Mtenever a person charged with a public offense or
|iientence of imprisonment is or becomes incompetent
pad, is defined in this chapter, a petition may be filed in
fekt court of the county where the charge is pending or
the person is confined.
[ft) The petition shall contain a certificate that it is filed
[good faith and on reasonable grounds to believe the
•Vfidant is incompetent to proceed. The petition shall
•tain a recital of the facts, observations, and conversa• » with the defendant that have formed the basis for
i petition. If filed by defense counsel, the petition shall
•tain such information without invading the lawyerhat privilege.
jfe) The petition may be based upon knowledge or
jkfmation and belief and may be filed by the party
kfed incompetent to proceed, any person acting on his
laalf, the prosecuting attorney, or any person having
•tody or supervision over the person.
I W4
u>
4 Court may raise issue of competency at any

j£*! time.

laoort in which a charge is pending may raise the issue
t defendant's competency at any time. If raised by the
fcunsel for each party shall be permitted to address the
Ifcompetency.
1994
? ..
V Order for hearing — Stay oi other proceedings
V — Examinations of defendant — S c o p e of
jfc examination a n d report.
Iben a petition is filed pursuant to Section 77-15-3
2the issue of the defendant's competency to stand trial
m the court raises the issue of the defendant's compefBituant to Section 77-15-4, the court in which proceed•i pending shall stay all proceedings. If the proceedings
I t court other than the district court in which the
•aiafiled,the district court shall notify that court of the
afthe petition. The district court in which the petition is
aVtll pass upon the sufficiency of the allegations of
attency. If a petition is opposed by either party, the court
jfnor to granting or denying the petition, hold a limited
afttlely for the purpose of determining the sufficiency of
*jtkm. If the court finds that the allegations of incomItj raise a bona fide doubt as to the defendants compeliitand trial, it shall enter an order for a hearing on the
I condition of the person who is the subject of the
fU) After the granting of a petition and poor to a full
Impetency hearing, the court may order the Department
tHuman Services to examine the person and to report to
It court concerning the defendant's mental condition.
;Jb) The defendant shall be examined by at least two
jiatal health experts not involved in the current treat
*atof the defendant.
fe) If the issue is sufficiently raised in the petition or if
becomes apparent that the defendant may lie incompefctdue to mental retardation, at least one expert expe•Kfd in mental retardation assessment shall evaluate
^defendant. Upon appointment of the experts, the
titioner or other party as directed by the court shall
rlfide information and materials to the examiners reljfttt to a determination of the defendant's competency
atihall provide copies of the charging document, arrest
undent reports pertaining to the charged offense,

known criminal history information, and knowi i pru n
mental health evaluations and treatments.
(d) The court may make the necessary orders to provide the information listed in Subsection (c) to the examiners.
(3) During the examination under Subsection (2), unless
the court or the executive director of the department directs
otherwise, the defendant shall be retained in the same custody
or status he was in at the time the examination was ordered.
<4) The experts shall in the conduct of their examination
and in their report to the court consider and address, in
addition to any other factors determined to be relevant by the
experts:
(a) the defendant's present capacity to:
(i) comprehend and appreciate the charges or alle
gations against him;
(ii) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and
states of mind;
(iii) comprehend and appreciate the range arid
nature of possible penalties, if applicable, that may be
imposed in the proceedings against him;
(iv) engage in reasoned choice of legal strategics
and options;
(v) understand the adversary nature of the pro
ceedings against him;
(vi) manifest appropriate courtroom behavior; and
(vii) testify relevantly, if applicable;
(b) the impact of the mental disorder, or mental retardation, if any, on the nature and quality of the defendant's
relationship with counsel;
(c) if psychoactive medication is current.lv being adiimi
istered:
(I) whether the medication is necessary to maintain the defendant's competency; and
(ii) the effect of the medication, if any, on the
defendant's demeanor and affect and ability to participate in the proceedings.
(5) If the expert's opinion is that the defendant is incompetent to proceed, the expert shall indicate in the report:
(a) which of the above factors contributes to the defendant's incompetency;
(b) the nature of the defendant's mental disorder or
mental retardation and its relationship to the factors
contributing to the defendant's incompetency;
(c) the treatment or treatments appropriate and available; and
(d) the defendant's capacitv to give informed consent to
treatment to restore competency.
(6) The experts examining the defendant shall provide an
initial report to the court and the prosecuting and defense
attorneys within 30 days of the receipt of the court's order. The
report shall inform the court of the examiner's opinion concerning the competency of the defendant to stand trial, or, in
the alternative, the examiner may inform the court in writing
that additional time is needed to complete the report. If the
examiner informs the court that additional tune is needed, the
examiner shall have up to an additional 30 days to provide the
report to the court and counsel. The examiner must provide
the report within 60 days from the receipt of the court's order
unless, for good cause shown, the court authorizes an additional period of time to complete the examination and provide
the report.
(7) Any written report submitted by the experts shall:
(a) identify the specific matters referred for evaluation;
(b) describe the procedures, techniques, and tests used
in the examination and the purpose or purposes for each;
(c) state the experts clinical observations, findings,
and opinions on each issue referred for examination by

the court, and indicate specifically those issues, if any, on
which the expert could not give an opinion; and
(d) identify the sources of information used by the
expert and present the basis for the expert's clinical
findings and opinions.
(8) (a) Any statement made by the defendant in the course
of any competency examination, whether the examination
is with or without the consent of the defendant, any
testimony by the expert based upon such statement, and
any other fruits of the statement may not be admitted in
evidence against the defendant in any criminal proceeding except on an issue respecting mental condition on
which the defendant has introduced evidence. The evidence may be admitted, however, where relevant to a
determination of the defendant's competency.
.(b) Prior to examining the defendant, examiners
should specifically advise the defendant of the limit?
confidentiality as provided under this subsection.
(9) When the report is received the court shall set a date for
a mental hearing which shall be held in not less than five and
not more than 15 days, unless the court enlarges the time for
good cause. The hearing shall be conducted according to the
procedures outlined in Subsections 62A-12-234(9Kb) through
(9)(f). Any person or organization directed by the department
to conduct the examination may be subpoenaed to testify at
the hearing. If the experts are in conflict as to the competency
of the defendant, all experts should be called to testify at the
hearing if reasonably available. The court may call any
examiner to testify at the hearing who is not called by the
parties. If the court calls an examiner, counsel for the parties
may cross-examine the expert.
(10) A person shall be presumed competent unless the
court, by a preponderance of the evidence, finds the person
incompetent to proceed. The burden of proof is upon the
proponent of incompetency at the hearing. An adjudication of
incompetency to proceed shall not operate as an adjudication
of incompetency to give informed consent for medical treatment or for any other purpose, unless specifically set forth in
the court order.
(11) (a) If the court finds the defendant incompetent to
stand trial, its order shall contain findings addressing
each of the factors in Subsections 77-15-5(4)(a) and (b).
The order issued pursuant to Subsection 77-15-6(1) which
the court sends to the facility where the defendant is
committed or to the person who is responsible for assessing his progress toward competency shall be provided
contemporaneously with the transportation and commitment order of the defendant, unless exigent circumstances require earlier commitment in which case the
court shall forward the order within five working days of
the order of transportation and commitment of the defendant.
(b) The order finding the defendant incompetent In
stand trial shall be accompanied by:
(i) copies of the reports of the experts filed w nth II
court pursuant to the order of examin.itjr>ii i( mil
provided previously;
(ii) copies of any of th*» psychiatric, psychological,
or social work reports submitted to the court relative
to the mental condition of the defendant;
(hi) any other documents made available to the
court by either the defense or the prosecution, pertaining to the defendants current or past mental
condition.
112) If the court finds it necessary to order the defendant
transported prior to the completion of findings and compilation of documents required under Subsection (11). the transportation and commitment order delivering the defendant to
the Utah State Hospital, or other mentrl health facility as

directed by the executive director of the Department of Human Services or his designee, shall indicate that the defen
dant's commitment is based upon a finding of incompetency,
and the mental health facility's copy of the order shall be
accompanied by the reports of any experts filed with the court
pursuant to the order of examination. The executive director
of the Department of Human Services or his designee may
refuse to accept a defendant as a patient unless he is accompanied by a transportation and commitment order which is
accompanied by the reports.
(13) Upon a finding of incompetency to stand trial by the
court, the 'prosecuting and defense attorneys shall provide
information and materials relevant to the defendants competency to the facility where the defendant is committed or to tht
person responsible for assessing his progress towards competency. In addition to any other materials, the prosecuting
attorney shall provide:
(a) copies of the charging document and supporting
affidavits or other documents used in the determination of
probable cause;
(b) arrest or incident reports prepared by a law enforcement agency pertaining to the charged offense;
(c) information concerning the defendant's known
criminal history.
(14) The court may make any reasonable order to insure
compliance with this section.
(15) Failure to comply with this section shall not result in
the dismissal of criminal charges.
in<
77-15-6.

C o m m i t m e n t on finding of incompetency to
stand trial — S u b s e q u e n t h e a r i n g s — Notice

to prosecuting attorneys.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (5). if after hearing,;
the person is found to be incompetent to stand trial, the court j
shall order the defendant committed to the custody of the
executive director of the Department of Human Services orhif
designee for the purpose of treatment intended to restore tht l
defendant to competency. The court may recommend but not]
order placement of the defendant. The court may, however,
order that the defendant be placed in a secure setting rather I
than a nonsecure setting. The director or his designee shall
designate the specific placement of the defendant during the
period of evaluation and treatment to restore competency.
(2) The examiner or examiners designated by the executive
director to assess the defendants progress toward competency
may not be involved in the routine treatment of the defendant I
The examiner or examiners shall provide a full report to thtI
court and prosecuting and defense attorneys within 90 days o( I
receipt of the court's order. If any examiner is unable til
complete the assessment within 90 days, that examiner shill
provide to the court and counsel a summary progress repoll
which informs the court that additional time is necessary ffl
complete the assessment, in which case the examiner shallI
have up to an additional 90 days to provide the full report. Tie I
full report shall assess:
I
(a) the facility's or programs capacity to provideappr»I
pnate treatment for the defendant;
I
(b) the nature of treatments provided to the defendant I
<c) what progress toward competency restoration ha I
been made with respect to the factors identified bv {-*!
court in its initial order;
j
(d) the defendant's current level of mental disnrHv j
:
mental retardation and need for treatment. f any; aivi \
(e) the likelihood of restoration of competency im! t : , |
amount of time estimated to achieve it.
i
(3) The court o»* its own motion or upon motion by c:uV|
party or by the executive director may appoint addition'!
mental health examiners to examine the defendant and anWl
the court on his current mental status and progress town!
competency restoration.

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
.1) I'uu.i receipt ui ilit; full jvpuit, ilic court shall lioici a
^ »nng Ui ifctvrmuu: the dcleadxats current titittus. At the
-aimg, the burden of proving that the defendant is compeiuitison I he proponent of competency. Following the hearing,
thrf court shall determine by a preponderance ui' evidence
*?.«*ther the defendant is:
(u) competent to stand trial;
(b) incompetent to stand trial with a substantial prob• ability th&t the defendant may become competent in, the
foreseeable future: or
(c) incompetent to stand trial without a substantial
probability that the defendant may become competent in
the foreseeable future.
(5) (a) If the court enters a finding pursuant to Subsection
(4Xa), the court shall proceed with the trial or such other
procedures as may be necessary to adjudicate the charges.
(b) If the court enters a finding p u r s u a n t to Subsection
(4Kb), the court may order that the defendant remain
committed to the custody of the executive director of the
Department of Human Services or his designee for the
purpose of treatment intended to restore the defendant to
competency.
(c) If the court enters a finding p u r s u a n t to Subsection
(4)(c), the court shall order the defendant released from
the custody of the director unless the prosecutor informs
the court that commitment proceedings p u r s u a n t to Title
&2A, Chapter 1% AtartaJ JJeuJth, or T>t)e 62A, Chapter 5,
Services to People with Disabilities, will be initiated.
These commitment proceedings must be initiated within
seven days after the court's order entering the finding in
Subsection (4He), unless the court enlarges the time for
good cause shown. The defendant may be ordered to
remain in the custody of the director until commitment
proceedings have been concluded. If the defendant is
committed, the court which entered the order pursuant to
Subsection (4Mo, shall be notified by the director at least
ten days prior to any release of the committed person.
(6) If the defendant is recommitted to the department
pursuant to Subsection (5)(b), the court shall hold a hearing
one year following the recommitment.
(7) At the hearing held pursuant to Subsection (6), except
for defendants charged with the crimes listed in Subsection
(tJ), a defendant who has not been restored to competency shall
be ordered released or temporarily detained pending civil
commitment proceedings under the same terms-as provided in
Subsection (5)(c).
(8) If the defendant has been charged with aggravated
murder, murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, or a first
degree felony and the court determines that the defendant is
making reasonable progress towards restoration of competency at the time of the hearing held pursuant to Subsection
(6), the court may order the defendant recommitted for a
period not to exceed 18 months for the purpose of treatment to
restore the defendant to competency with a mandatory review
hearirig at the end of the 18-month period.
(9) Except for defendants charged with aggravated murder
or murder, a defendant who has not been restored to competency at the time of the hearing held pursuant to Subsection
(8) shall be ordered released or temporarily detained pending
civil commitment proceedings under the same terms as provided in Subsection (5)(c).
(10) If the defendant has been charged with aggravated
murder or murder and the court determines t h a t he is making
reasonable progress towards restoration of competency nt the
time of the mandatory review hearing held pursuant to
Subsection (8), the court may order the defendant recommitted for a period not to exceed 36 months for the purpose of
treatment to restore him to competency.

77-15-9

t i l ) II the defendant is recommitted to the department
pursuant to Su6sec(jou ( 101, the court shaft hold a hearing no
later than at 18-month intervals following the recommitment
lor the purpose of determining the defendant's competency
status,
(12) A deleiuiiiiit. who has not been restored to competency
at the expiration of the additional 36-month commitment
period ordered pursuant to Subsection (10) shall be ordered
released or temporarily detained pending civil commitment
proceedings under the same terms as provided in Subsection
(5)(c).
(13) In n o event may the maximum period of detention
under this section exceed the maximum period of incarceration which the defendant could receive if he were convicted of
the charged offense. This subsection does not preclude pursuing involuntary civil commitment nor does it place any time
limit on civil commitments.
(14) Neither release from a pretrial incompetency commitment under the provisions of this section nor civil commitment
requires dismissal of criminal charges. The court may retain
jurisdiction over the criminal case and may order periodic
reviews to assess the defendant's competency to stand trial.
(15) A defendant who is civilly committed pursuant to Title
62A, Chapter 12, Mental Health, or Title 62A, Chapter 5,
Services to People with Disabilities, may still be adjudicated
competent to stand trial under this chapter.
(16) (a) The remedy for a violation of the time periods
specified in this section, other than those specified in
Subsection (5)(c), (7), (9), (12), or (13), shall be a motion to
compel the hearing, or m a n d a m u s , but not release from
detention or dismissal of the criminal charges.
(b) The remedy for a violation of the time periods
specified in Subsection (5)(c), (7), (9), (12), or (13) shall not
be dismissal of the criminal charges.
(17) In cases in which the t r e a t m e n t of the defendant is
precluded by court order for a period of time, that time period
may not be considered in computing time limitations under
this section.
(18) At any time that the defendant becomes competent to
stand trial, the clinical director of the hospital or other facility
or the executive director of the Department of Human Services
shall certify that fact to the court. The court shall conduct a
hearing within 15 working days of the receipt of the clinical
director's or executive director's report, unless the court enlarges the time for good cause.
• 19) The court may order a hearing or rehearing at any time
on its own motion or upon recommendations of the clinical
director of the hospital or other facility or the executive
director of the Department of H u m a n Services.
(20) Notice of a hearing on competency to stand trial shall
be given to the prosecuting attorney. If the hearing is held in
the county where the defendant is confined, notice shall also
be given to the prosecuting attorney for that county.
1M4
77-15*7.

S t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s a n d s p e e d y trial — Effect of i n c o m p e t e n c y of defendant.
(1) The statute of limitations is tolled during any period in
which the defendant is adjudicated incompetent to proceed.
(2) Any period of time during which the defendant has been
adjudicated incompetent and any period during which he is
being evaluated for competency may not be computed in
determining the defendant's speedy trial rights.
I«M
77-15.8. Bail e x o n e r a t e d o n c o m m i t m e n t of defendant.
When a defendant awaiting trial is committed to a mental
health facility, bail shall be exonerated
!•••
77-15*9. E x p e n s e s .
(1) In determining the competence oi a defendant to proce e d, i! x pe uses o 1" i • x; 1111 in J i Li u 11, t >; bs e rv a t i o n, 111 t re a t m e n t,

excluding travel to and from tiny mental health facility, shall
be charged to the Department of Human Services when the
offen5e is a state ofTense. Travel expenses incurred by the
defendant shall be charged to the county where prosecution is
commenced. Examination of defendants on local ordinance
violations shall be charged by the department to the municipality or county commencing the prosecution
(2) When examination is initiated by the court or on motion
of the prosecutor, expenses of commitment ano treatment of
the person confined to a mental health facility after examination, if he is determined to be incompetent to proceed, shall
also be charged to the department.
(3) Expenses of examination, treatment, or confinement in
a mental health facility for any person who has been convicted
of a crime and placed in a state correctional facility shall be
charged to the Department of Corrections.
(4) If the defendant, after examination, is found to be
competent by the court, all subsequent costs are charged to
the county commencing prosecution., If the defendant requested the examination and is found to be competent by the
court, the department may recover the expenses of the examination from the defendant
i f• t
CHAPTER 16
MENTAL EXAMINATION AFTER CONVICTION
Section
77-16-1
774,6 2
77 16 3.
77 16 4.
77-16 5

Grounds for ordering examination.
Appointment of examining alienists — Report —
Additional evidence by defendant — Findings
— Sentencing — Compensation of alienists.
Care and treatment of persons committed.
Defendant incapable of treatment at state hospi
Recovery of committed person — Certification to
Board of Pardons and Parole.

77-16-1. Grounds for ordering examination.
Whenever any person is convicted of or pleads guilty to rape,
forcible sodomy, forcible sexual abuse, aggravated sexual
assault, aggravated kidnaping, aggravated assault, mayhem,
or an attempt to commit any of the foregoing crimes, and when
it appears to the court either upon its own observation or upon
evidence otherwise presented, that the defendant may be
suffering from any form of mental disease or defect which may
have substantially contributed to the commission of the offense, the court shall order a mental examination of that
person
irao
77-16 2

Appointment of examining alienists — Report
— Additional evidence by defendant — Findings —- Sentencing — Compensation of alienists.
(1) The examination of the defendant shall be conducted by
two or more alienists appointed by the judge. Upon completion
of the examination but not later than 30 days after the order
directing the examination, a written report of the results shall
be provided to the sentencing judge. If the report discloses that
the person is not suffering from any form of mental disease or
defect vjYnth Ta»y have aub&tzmtiaUy contributed \.n the commission of the ofTense, the judge, after affording the defendant
an opportunity to see the report, may impose sentence. Prior
to the imposition of sentence, if the defendant so desires, he
may offer additional evidence on the question of his mental
condition.
(2) If the report or other evidence presented to the court
discloses that the defendant suffers from any form of mental
disease or defect which substantially contributed to the commission of the offense, but which was not of such magnitude <*r

to preclude sentence, the judge shall make written findings^!
fact as to the defendants condition and order him committed I
to the Utah state prison or other facility for indefinite confirm!
ment for treatment until the defendant is otherwise release!
pursuant to this chapter.
(3) The judge shall fix the compensation, if any, to be pairf]
the examining alienists and upon certification of the amountI
of compensation by the judge, the county executive in Lfafl
courxty whecem the o>CCeojs& was caomitted shall mata ^iyl
ment.
IM|
77-16-3. Care and treatment of persons committed
The clinical director of the Utah State Hospital shall provide
for the treatment and care of persons committed to tbt
hospital under this chapter and shall render treatment whkk
in his judgment is best suited to care for the needs of sud
persons.
mi
77-16-4. Defendant incapable of treatment at staaj
hospital — Hearing — Proceeding.
j
If the clinical director of the state hospital concludes, or tin
defendant contends, that the defendant is not capable im
receiving treatment, or that appropriate treatment is td\
available at the hospital, either may petition the sentendn;
court to return the defendant before the court for forth*
proceedings. If the court finds that the defendant is nd|
capable of receiving treatment, or that appropriate treatmen
is not available at that hospital for the defendant, he shil
proceed the same as if the defendant had not been proceed^
against under this chapter, with credit being given for tin
time spent at the hospital.
m
77-16-5. Recovery of committed person — Certificatioi
to Board of Pardons and Parole.
I) (a) A person committed to the state hospital after ser
disease or defect shall be certified to the Board of Panto
and Parole by the clinical director.
(b) Upon certification, jurisdiction over the person ahal
be transferred to the Board of Pardons and Parole and Ml
shall be pardoned, paroled or confined in the state pnWl
for the unexpired term for the offense as provided by l i u
with credit for time served while confined at the hospital!!
The certification of the clinical director of th* hospitn
shall specify with particularity the medical facts justij^j
ing his certification.
(2) The provisions of law and the iriics and regulation^
promulgated pursuant thereto, regarding parole shall apply
persons paroled from the state hospital.
ll
CHAPTER 16a
COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALU
ILL PERSONS
;
i

Section
77-16a-l to 77-16a-8. Repealed.
Purl, 1

a
:|

Plea and 'Verdict of" Guilt] ' and Mentally HI
77-16a-101.
7M©a-M>2.
77-16a-103.
77-16a-104

Definitions.
Jury instructions.
Plea of guilty and mentally ill.
Verdict of guilty and mentally ill - - Hearingl£|
determine present mental state.
Part 2

Disposition of Defendants Found Guilty
and Mentally 111
obation.

I

,vr

the sending institution of the decision of the application for
international transfer.
(3) All arrangements regarding the treaty pi ocess and
proposed assurances shall be negotiated between the bureau
and the United States Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs.
1»W

77-28b-9. Transfer of offender.
(1) If the inmate is accepted for international transfei by
the United States Department of Justice. Office of International Affairs, the offender shall be transported by the Department of Corrections to the federal district court for a verification hearing to ensure the offender consents to the
international transfer.
(2) The Department of Corrections shall then relinquish
jurisdiction over the offender to the United States Depnrtment
of Justice.
iwo
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section (1). the prosecuting attorney or the defendant orau
counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with the prisoner
or his counsel being present, may be granted any reasonable
continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 12C
days, or within such continuance as has been granted, and
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the action, the coin
shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that the failiir
of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter hea^i with.:,
the time required is not supported by good cause, v-heOier i
previous motion for continuance was made or not. the ro,.r.
shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice.
no
77-29-2. Duty of custodial officer to inform prison?* of
untried indictments or informations.
The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall prompth
inform a prisoner in writing of the source and contents of ant
untried indictments or informations against that prisoner
concerning which he has knowledge and of that prisoner!
right to make a request for final disposition thereof.
1M

IC IS!: OSI 1 IC I I C F DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS 77-29-3. Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persou
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person J
while adjudged to be incompetent to proceed under Chapter.!
Section
IM
77-29-1.
Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending 15
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Con77-29-4. Escape of prisoner voids demand.
tinuance may be granted — Dismissal of
Escape from custody by a prisoner after delivery of tatl
charge for failure to bring to trial.
written demand referred to in Subsection 77-29-1(1) shall void j
77-29-2.,
Duty of custodial officer to inform prisoner of
the request.
n
untried indictments or informations.
77 29 3.
Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons.
17-29-6. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactf
77-29-4.
Escape of prisoner voids demand.
men! into law — Text of agreement
77-29-5.
Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted]
into law — Text of agreement.
into law and entered into by this state with all other jurisdiol
77-29-6.
Interstate agreement — "Appropriate court"* de- tions legally joining therein in the form substantially e*|
follows:
fined.
77-29-7.
Interstate agreement — Duty of state agencies
The contracting states solemnly agree that:
and political subdivisions to cooperate.
ARTICLE I
77-29-8.
Interstate agreement — Application of habitual
criminal law.
The party states find that - charges outs tan ding' againiti]
77-29-9.
Intcrstate agreement — Escnfm ol! pi m n ici w IniIc prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, infori
in temporary custody.
tions or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial ef J
77-29-10.
Interstate agreement — Duty of warden.
persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produaf
77-29-11.
Interstate agreement — Attorney general as ad
uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment!
ministrator and information agent.
and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the piny]
states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage tkj
77 29 1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and deli
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Con- mination of the proper status of any and all detainers based •
tinuance may be granted — Dismissal : if untried indictments, informations or complaints. The ptitrj
states also find that proceedings with reference to
charge for failure to bring to trial.
charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurin
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment
diction, cannot properly be had in the absence of co-operatinJ
in the state prison, jail or other penal or correctional instituprocedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement I
tion of this state, and there is pending against the prisoner in
provide such co-operative procedures.
this state any untried indictment or information, and the
prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer
in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written
demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court
wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to
trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of
the demand described in Subsection (1), shall immediately
cause the demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate
prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, provide the attorney with such information
concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner
as shall be requested.

ind

m*

ARTICLE II
used in this agreement:
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States;!
United States of America; a territory or possession of tat]
United States; District of Columbia; the CommonweaJti]
of Puerto Rico.
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which J
prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he initiates I
request for final dispositions pursuant to Article III1
or at the time that a request for custody or availability t j
initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof.
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which t
is to be had on an indictment, information or comp
pursuant to Article III or Article IV hereof.

•v
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ARTICLE III
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never a person has entered upon a term of impnsznt
iil a penal or correctional institution of a party state,
during the continuance of the term of imprisi8 pending in any other party state any untried
, information or complaint on the basis of which a
his been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be
o trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to
red to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate
be prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of
of his imprisonment and his request for a final
to be made of the indictment, information or
• •-it; provided that for good cause shown in open court,
I prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having
| jWon of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonI Continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accomby a certificate of the appropriate official having
f of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under
J the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the
|*rmaiiiing to be served on the sentence, the amount of
J time named, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner,
\ lay decisions of the state parole agency relating to the

*i"n>e written notice and request for final disposition
i to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the
• to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other
I having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it
tr with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting
land court by registered or certified mail, return receipt
sited.
) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official
I custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of
I tource and contents of any detainer lodged against him
) shall also inform him of his right to make a request for
1 disposition of the indictment, information or complaint
ivhich the detainer is based.
t) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner
uant to paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for
I disposition of all untried indictments, informations or
liopiamu on the basis of which detainers have been lodged
Hpnst the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting
l#Lal ihe request for final disposition is specifically directed.
I ft* ..urJcn, commissioner of corrections or other official
lUrng custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all
l^pRpnate prosecuting officers and courts in the several
itrhQutions within the stale to which the prisoner's request
|fcr nn;.l disposition is being sent of the p oceeding being
i par* ,;•*: itjlit.1 hy the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to
tfcj ..\; digraph shall be accompanied by copies of the prisono sucir^'; Oji;.
A..uen notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not
1\U- '•'• any indictment, information or complaint contem[ pieu.... re by prior to the return of the prisoner to the original
to'
^'inipiisonment, such indictment, information or com|iy!ai!:t &hali not be of any further force or effect, and the court
|!4ul) tuicr an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
;e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner
I pursuant to a paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be
l.ivaiver of extradition with respect to any charge or proceedrjCf contemplated thereby or included therein by reason of
.paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to tiie
I Wiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him,
J iter completion of his term of imprisonment in the sending
tiUtc. The request for final disposition shall also constitute a
f anient by the prisoner to the production of his body in any
fturt where his presence may be required in order to effectut*i£ the purposes of this agreement and a further consent
n triai^
luluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonplaint =
fwtnt in accordance with the provisions of this agreement.

77-29-5

Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a
concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law.
(f) Escape from custody by the pnsoner subsequent to his
execution of the request for final disposition referred to in
paragraph (a) hereof shall void the request.
ARTICLE IV
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction i l t which u l I
untried indictment, information or complaint is pending shall
be entitled tu have a prisoner against whom he has lodged a
detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any
party state made available in accordance with Article V(a)
hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary
custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the
state in which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the
court having jurisdiction of such indictment, information or
complaint shall have duly approved, recorded und transmitted
the request; and provided further that there shall be a period
of 30 days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before
the request be honored, within which period the governor of
the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary
custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon
motion of the prisoner.
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided
in paragraph (a) hereof, the appropnate authorities having
the prisoner in custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner
is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to
be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the
time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of
the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged detainers
against the prisoner with similar certificates and with notices
informing them of the request for custody or availability and
of the reasons therefor.
c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this
article, trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty
days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for
good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel
l>eing present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may
grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to
deprive any prisoner of any right which he may have to t ontest
the legality of his delivery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof,
but such delivery may not be opposed or denied on the ground
that the executive authority of the sending state has not
affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.
ie) If tnai is nut had on any indictment, information or
complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoners being
returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to
Article v*(e) hereof, such indictment, information or complaint
shall not be of anv further force or effect, and the court shall
enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
ARTICLE V
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or
Article IV hereof, the appropriate authority in a sending state
shall offer to deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the
appropriate authority in the state where such indictment,
information or complaint is pending against such person in
order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the
request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer
of temporary custody shall accompany the written notice
provided for in Article III of this agreement. In the case of a
federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving
state shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by
this agreement or to the prisoners presence in federal custody

determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made!
an ofTer of temporary custody shall present the following upon available by this agreement, shall apply to any person whoiij
demand:
adjudged to be mentally ill.
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority
ARTICLE VII
to act for the state into whose temporary custody the
prisoner is to be given.
Each state party to this pgrecment shall designate an officer I
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information who, acting jointly with like officers of other party states, shall I
or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively 1
lodged and on the basis of which the request for tempo- the terms and provisions of this agreement, and who shall'
rary custody of the prisoner has been made.
provide, within and without the state, information necess'- ]
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept to the effective operation of this agreement.
temporary custody of said person, or in the event that an
ARTICLE VIII
action on the* indictment, information or complaint on the
basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a I
trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV party state when such state has enacted the same into law. A R]
hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the state party to this agreement may withdraw herefrom enact- jfil
indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall ing a statute repealing the same. However, the withdrawal of fc
enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already fiv
detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect. initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time suck
(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights r
shall be only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the respect thereof.
charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictARTICLE IX
ments, informations or complaints which form the basis of the
detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or
This agreement shall he liberally construed so r:.*> to i ffcrtu
charges arising out of the same transaction. Except for his ate its purposes. The provisions of this agrcciner.!. ;hnll h*
attendance at court and while boing transported to or from severable and if my phrase, clause, sentence or provision of
any plarr at which his presence may be required, the prisoner this agreement is declared to be contrary to the Constitution of
shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly used any party state or of the United States or the applicability
for persons awaiting prosecution.
thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance if
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the held invalid, the validity cf the remainder of this agreement
purpose* of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to and the applicability thereof to any government, agency
the sending state.
nerson or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If tlu
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while agreement shall be held contrary to the Constitution of any
the prisoner is otherwise being made available for trial as state party hereto, the agreement shall remain in full fore
required by this agreement, time being served on the sentence and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effed
IM
shall continue to run but good time shall be earned by the as to the state affected as to all severable matters.
prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of
77- 29 6. Interstate agrceivcnt
"'Appropriate courf |
the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.
defined.
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary
The phrase "appropriate court" as used in the agreement ot |
custody as provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisdetainers
shall, with reference to the courts of this state, meat
oner shall be deemed to remain in the custody of and subject
to the jurisdiction of the ending state and any escape from any court with criminal jurisdiction in the matter involved.
1M|
temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as
an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any 77-29-7. Inl erst a to agreement — Duty of state agencies |
other manner permitted by law.
and political subdivisions to cooperate.
(h) From the time that a parry state receives custody of a
All courts, deportments, agencies, officers and employees of I
prisoner pursuant to this agreement until such prisoner is this state and its political subdivisions are hereby directed ti |
returned to the territory and custody of the sending state, the enforce the agreement on detainers and to cooperate withratI
state in which the one or more untried indictments, informa- another and with other party states in enforcing the agree* I
iw I
tions or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had ment and effectuating its purpose.
shall be responsible for the pnsoner and shall also pay all
costs of transporting, caring for. keeping and returning the 77-29-8, interstate agreement — Application of na- j
bitual criminal law.
prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless
Nothing in the agreement on detainers shall be construed a I
the states concerned shall have entered into a supplementary
agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and require the application of the habitual criminal law of this I
state to any person as a result of any conviction had in • l
responsibilities as between or among themselves. Nothing proceeding brought to final disposition by reason of the userf|
herein contained shall be construed to alter or affect any said agreement.
1
internal relationship among the departments, agencies and
officers of and in the government of a party state, or between 77-29-9. Interstate agreement — Escape of prisoner]
a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs,
while in temporary custody.
or responsibilities therefor.
Escape or attempt to escape from custody, whether within or I
without this state, while in the temporary custody of aal
ARTICLE VI
authority of another state acting pursuant to the agreement j
,«, *.i determining the duration and expiration dates of the on detainers shall constitute an offense agaii.st this sfc
time periods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, Such escape or attempt to escape shall constitute an offense a j
the running of said time periods shall lie tolled whenever and the same extent and degree as an escape from the institution |

i
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ia which the prisoner was couuned immediately prior to
having been released to temporary custody, and shall be
punishable in the same manner as an escape or attempt to
escape from said institution.
isso

tions of governor in a state other t h a n this state. The term
"state," referring to a state oilier than this state, includes any
other state or territory, organized or unorganized, of the
United States of America.
isso

77-20-10. Interstate agreement — Duty of ward t o .
It shall be lawful and mandatory upon the warden or other
official in charge of a penal or correctional institution in this
state to deliver any inmate thereof whenever so required by
the operation of the agreement on detainers.
isso

77*30-2. Duty of g o v e r n o r to d e l i v e r p e r s o n charged
- with crime u p o n d e m a n d by o t h e r state.
Subject to the provisions of this act, the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States controlling, and any and all
Acts of Congress enacted in pursuance thereof, it is the duty of
the governor of this state to have arrested and delivered up to
the executive authority of any other state of the United States
any person charged in that state with treason, felony or other
crime who has fled from justice and is found in this state.

77*29-11. Interstate agreement — Attorney general as
administrator and information agent.
The attorney general is hereby designated as the officer who
shall be the central administrator of and information agent for
the agreement on detainers as provided in Article MI of the
agreement.
isso
CHAPTER 30
EXTILdMTION
Section
77-30-1.
77-30-2.
77-30-3.
77-30-4.
77-30-5.

77-30-6.

77-30-7.
T/.'iO 8.
77-3U-9.
7V-30-1O.

;;-:io-u.
"-30-IU.
.;-:»o-i;s.
-;-;io-i*s.
77-30-15.
77-30-16;
77-30-17.
77-30-18.
77-30-19.
77-30-20.
77-30-21.
77-30-22.
77-30-23.
77-30-24.
77-30-25.

77-30-26.
77-30-27.
77-30-28.

Definitions.
Duty of governor to deliver person charged with
crime upon demand by other state.
Form of demand — What documents presented
must show.
Governur may investigate demand.
Extradition for prosecution before conclusion of
trial or term in other state — Return of person
involuntarily leaving demanding state.
Extradition for crime committed in another state
by person while in this state.
Governor's warrant of arrest — U e a t a L
Execution of w a r r a n t of arrest.
Authority of officers under warrant of «*rrest.
Time to apply for habeas corpus allowed.
Penalty i«>i' disobedience of habeas corpus.
Officers entitled to use local jails.
Fugitives from justice — Wairuat of arrest.
Arrest without warrant.
Commitment pending arrest under w a r r a n t of
governor.
Amount of bail.
Procedure when nu arrest made under w a r r a n t of
governor.
Forfeiture of bail.
Procedure if prosecution pending in this state.
Governor not to inquire into guilt or innocence.
Governor's w a r r a n t of arrest recalled or another
issued.
Fugitives from this state — Issuance of governor's warrant.
Fugitives from this state — Applications for
requisition for return.
Payment of expenses — Extradition costs.
Person brought into state on extradition exempt
from civil process — Waiver of extradition
proceedings — Non-waiver by this state.
Prosecution not limited to crime specified in
requisition.
Uniformity of interpretation.
Citation — Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.

77-30-1. Definitions.
Where appearing in this act, the term "governor" includes
any person periormmg the functions of governor by authority
of the law of this state. The term "executive authority"
includes the governor and any person performing the func-

ISSO

77-30-3. Form of demand — What documents presented must show.
No demand for the extradition of a person charged with a
crime in another state shall be recognized by the governor
unless in writing alleging, except in cases arising under
Section 77-30-6, that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
and that thereafter hefledfrom the state, and accompanied by
a copy of an indictment found or by information supported by
affidavit in the state having jurisdiction of the crime, or by a
copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate there, together
with a copy of any warrant which was issued thereupon or by
a copy of a judgment of conviction or of a sentence composed in
execution, together with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the person claimed has
escaped from confinement or has broken the tei ins of his bail,
probation or parole The indictment, information or affidavit
made before the magistrate must substantially charge the
person demanded with having committed a crime under the
law of that state and the copy of the indictment, information,
affidavit, judgment of conviction or sentence must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand. isso
77-30-4. Governor may investigate demand.
When a demand shall be made upon the governor of this
state by the executive authority of another state for the
surrender of a person so charged with a crime, the governor
may call upon the attorney general or any prosecuting officer
in this state to investigate or assist in investigating the
demand, and to report to him the situation and circumstances
of the person so demanded, and whether he ought to be
surrendered.
isso
77-30-5. Extradition for prosecution before conclusion
of trial or term in other state — Return of
person involuntarily leaving demanding
state.
When it is desired to have returned to this state a person
charged in this state with a crime, and such person is
imprisoned or is held under criminal proceedings then pending against him in another state, the governor of this state
may agree with the executive authority of such other state for
the extradition of such person before the conclusion of such
proceedings or his term of sentence in such other state, upon
condition that such person be returned to such other state at
the expense of this state as soon as the prosecution in this
state is terminated.
The governor of this state may also surrender on demand of
the executive authority of any other state any person in this
state who is charged in the manner provided in Section
77-30-23 with having violated the laws of the state whose
executive authority is making the demand, even though such
person left the demanding state involuntarily.
IMO
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